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NOTE
TAX LAW-THE DEVELOPMENT OF AND DIGRESSION FROM SEC
TION 105(c) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
I.

INTRODUCTION

Health insurance and the benefits that it provides are extremely
important to many people, I a fact that Congress has long recognized.
The first Revenue Act, enacted in 1918, contained a provision allowing
benefits received as compensation for injuries or sickness to be ex
cluded from gross income. 2 Although there have been major revisions
to the Internal Revenue Code since 1918, 3 this exclusion still exists, as
does the purpose that motivated the original enactment, to provide
some form of relief to those who must endure the misfortune of pain
and suffering. 4
In response to problems concerning whether the source of the
payments was a factor in qualifying for exclusion,!; Congress replaced
section 22(b)(5)6 with section 105(c) in 1954.7 Thus, although the ex
clusion privilege remains, the present exclusion statute, section
1. D. BICKELHAUPT, GENERAL INSURANCE 345 (1974). As of 1974, more than 180
million Americans (nearly nine out of ten) possessed some form of accident or health
insurance.
2. 26 U.S.C. § 213(b)(6) (1918). See infra note 11 for the text of this statute.
3. "[T]he Internal Revenue Code mirrors the major economic, political, and social
institutions dominating American life today." J. CHOMMIE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
7 (1968). Therefore, in an ever-changing society, the Internal Revenue Code must change
in order to fulfill society's changing needs and expectations.
4. For an analysis of Congress' intent underlying § 105(c), the current exclusion pro
vision, see infra notes 15-24, 56-67, and accompanying text.
5. During the 1940's and early 1950's, the exclusion's requirement that the payment
had to come from an insured plan proved to be the source of a great deal of confusion. At
one point, the IRS maintained that an "insured plan" was a plan underwritten by an
outside insurance carrier, while at other times, it maintained that it was not necessary for
the plan to be underwritten to qualify under the statute. For a detailed discussion of this
controversy, see infra notes 25-45 and accompanying text.
6. Section 22(b)(5) was not the first exclusion statute. Congress enacted the first ex
clusion statute, § 213(b)(6), in 1918. However, in 1939, the Internal Revenue Code was
recodified and § 22(b)(5) replaced § 213(b)(6), although the language of the statute essen
tially remained the same. See infra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
1. 26 U.S.C. § 105(c) (1982).
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105(c),8 is distinguishable from its predecessors. 9 Under section
105(c), it is not sufficient simply to receive the benefits because of a
permanent disability; instead, a number of requirements first must be
satisfied in order to exclude disability benefits from gross income.
While section 105(c) has solved the problems which existed prior to its
enactment, new problems have developed. In certain cases, the Inter
nal Revenue Service (IRS) and the courts may be misconstruing the
statute and disserving Congress' intent.
This comment traces the development of this exclusion privilege
from 1918 to the present, discussing in Section II the history of the
statutes and their specific provisions, and in Section III and IV, dis
cussing IRS and judicial interpretations of these statutes. Section IV
also presents a recent case involving a claim for exclusion under sec
tion 105(c) in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit applied an overly restrictive test and denied what this com
ment argues was a legitimate exclusion. lO
II.
A.

THE PURPOSE AND HISTORY OF THE EXCLUSION STATUTE

Pre-1954 Developments

From 1918 to 1954, section 213(b)(6) of the Revenue Act of
1918 11 and then section 22(b)(5) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1939 12 governed the excludibility of accident and health benefits from
8. Id.
9. See supra note 6. See infra notes 11-14 and accompanying text for the text and
discussion of the exclusion provisions which preceded § 105(c).
10. Beisler v. Commissioner, 814 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1987). See infra notes 137-70
and accompanying text.
.
11. 26 U.S.C. § 213(b)(6) (1918) stated:
That for the purposes of this title (except as otherwise provided in section
233) the term "gross income" 
(b) Does not include the following items, which shall be exempt from taxation
under this title:

•••

(6) Amounts received, through accident or health insurance or under work
men's compensation acts, as compensation for personal injuries or sickness, plus
the amount of any damages received whether by suit or agreement on account of
such injuries or sickness.

Id.
12. 26 U.S.C. § 22(b)(5) (1939), amended by 26 U.S.C. § 105 (1982). The statute
provided:
SEC. 22 GROSS INCOME
(b) EXCLUSIONS FROM GROSS INCOME - The following items shall not be
included in gross income and shall be exempt from taxation under this chapter:

•••

(5)

COMPENSATION FOR INJURIES OR SICKNESS -

Amounts received,
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the taxpayer's gross income. Using identical language, 13 the statutes
provided that payments from an ~ccident or health insurance plan that
compensated for personal injuries or sickness would be excluded from
the taxpayer's gross income.. 14
The legislative purpose underlying the statute has remained con
stant: to'provide some measure of relief to those who must endure the
misfortune of pain and suffering. The exclusion is necessary because
the Internal Revenue Code's definition of gross income is extremely
broad. 15 Although insurance benefits are not enumerated as income in
through accident or health insurance or under workmen's compensation acts, as
compensation for personal injuries or sickness, plus the amount of any damages
received whether by suit or agreement on account of such injuries or sickness.

Id.
13. Compare 26 U.S.C. § 22(b)(5) (1939), amended by 26 U.S.C. § 105 (1982) with
26 U.S.C. § 213(b)(6) (1918). See supra notes 11-12.
14. Unfortunately, the requirement that the payments come from an insured plan
proved to be the source of much controversy, prompting the enactment of § 105. See infra
notes 25-45 and accompanying text.
15. 26 U.S.C. § 61(a) (1982) provides:
GROSS INCOME DEFINED.

(a) General Definition. - Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross income
means all income from whatever source derived, including (but not limited to) the follow
ing items:
(1) Compensation for services, including fees, commissions, and similar items;
(2) Gross income derived from business;
(3) Gross income derived from dealings in property;
(4) Interest;
(5) Rents;
(6) Royalties;
(7) Dividends;
(8) Alimony and separate maintenance payments;
(9) Annuities;
(to) Income from life insurance and endowment contracts;
(11) Pensions;
(12) Income from discharge of indebtedness;
(13) Distributive share of partnership gross income;
(14) Income in respect of a decedent; and
(15) Income from an interest in an estate or trust.
See also Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28, 49 (1949) ("The income taxed is
described in sweeping terms and should be broadly construed in accordance with an obvi
ous purpose to tax income comprehensively."); Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 334
(1940) (citation omitted) ("The broad sweep of this language indicates the purpose of Con
gress to use the full measure of its taxing power within those definable categories. Hence
[the Supreme Court's] construction of the statute should be consonant with that pur
pose."); Blassie v. Commissioner, 394 F.2d 628, 630 (8th Cir. 1968) (citing Clifford, 309
U.S. at 334) ("In our view the language of Section 61(a) defining 'gross income' in broadest
terms manifests Congress' intention to exert the full measure of its taxing power over all
realized gains."); Heard v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 962, 966 (8th Cir. 1964) ("Gross in
come is defined very broadly by § 22(a) of the 1939 Code and by § 61(a) of the 1954 Code,
and includes all income from whatever source derived."), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964)
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section 61(a), the receipt of benefits from an accident or health insur
ance plan arguably is an accession to wealth over which the disabled
taxpayer has complete dominion and control and thus is income. I6
Unless excluded by section 105(c), the taxpayer would have to include
these benefits as gross income.
Two factors motivated Congress to enact this exclusion: a feeling
of pity and sorrow for the suffering taxpayer,I7 and a belief that com
pensation for an injury essentially is a "return of capital" to the tax
payer, which Congress traditionally has not taxed. IS 'With respect to
the first element, the disabled taxpayer receives a payment only as a
result of suffering a permanent, disabling injury. The purpose of the
payment is to compensate the taxpayer for any pain and aggravation
that he or she likely will be forced to endure for the duration of his or
her life. Congress therefore chooses to exempt these payments from
taxation "to avoid adding insult to injury."19 As the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit in Epmeier v. United States 20 stated, "The pro
visions ... undoubtedly were intended to relieve a taxpayer who has
the misfortune to become ill or injured, of the necessity of paying in
come tax upon insurance benefits received to combat the ravages of
(citations omitted); Haberman Farms, Inc. v. United States, 305 F.2d 787, 790 (8th Cir.
1962) (citing Clifford, 309 U.S. at 334) ("Gross income is broadly defined by § 22(a) of the
1939 Code and by § 61 (a) of the 1954 Code. . .. These and their corresponding predecessor
statutes have been said to indicate the purpose of Congress to use 'the full measure, of its
taxing power.' "); Schoenberg v. Commissioner, 302 F.2d 416, 418 (8th Cir. 1962) ("The
definition of income in the revenue statutes is very broad."); J. SNEED, THE CONFIGURA
TION OF GROSS INCOME 3 (1967) ("[T]he meaning of 'gross income,' while eluding precise
definition, has been said to be as broad as the word 'income' in the sixteenth amendment.");
see generally R. DAILEY, ITEMS OF GROSS INCOME (1967).
16. In Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955), the Supreme
Court stated that "[i]nstances of undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over,
which the taxpayer [has] complete dominion" are to be included in the taxpayer's gross
income. Id. at 431. See also Moore v. United States, 412 F.2d 974, 978 (5th Cir. 1969)
("An economic. gain is includable in gross income when its recipient has such control over
it that, as a practical matter, he derives readily realizable economic value from it.").
17. See generally Caplin v. United States, 718 F.2d 544 (2d' Cir. 1983); Schlenger,
Disability Benefits Under Section 22(b)(5), 40 VA. L. REV. 549, 550-52 (1954).
18. See Doyle v. Mitchell, 247 U.S. 179 (1918). The Court stated that "[i]n order to
determine whether there has been gain or loss, and the amount of the gain, if any, we must
withdraw from the gross proceeds an amount sufficient to restore the capital value that
existed at the commencement of the period under consideration." Id. at' 185. See also
Commissioner v. Pennroad Corp., 228 F.2d 329 (3d Cir. 1955). Citing Doyle, the court
held that petitioner receipt of a $15,000,000.00 settlement was tax-exempt because it repre
sented a partial return of the $66,380,000.00 that petitioner was forced to expend due to
defendant's fraud. Id. at 331-32.
19. Caplin v. United States, 718 F.2d 544, 548 (2d Cir. 1983); see also Schlenger,
supra note 17, at 552.
20. 199 F.2d 508 (7th Cir. 1952).
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disease or accident."21
The second factor which motivated Congress to enact the exclu
sion is the notion that this type of compensation is a "return of capi
tal" and thus not subject to taxation.22 Courts first applied this
exclusionary theory to tort recoveries that were intended to make the
plaintiff whole. 23 Disability benefits are similar to tort recoveries; both
seek to restore to the taxpayer something which has been taken away.
Congress treated them in the same way, excluding both from gross
income. 24 From the statute's enactment in 1918 to its amendment in
1954, courts and the IRS struggled to define the term "insurance or
health plan. "2S Congress never defined explicitly what would qualify
21. Id. at 511. This view is supported by Bertram Harnett's analysis of the purpose
behind the privilege. He states: "The answer seems to lie . . . in the fundamental notion
that the human body is not rea1lyproperty or capital [which] links with the feeling that the
taxation of recoveries carved from pain and suffering is offensive, and the victim is more to
be pitied rather than taxed." Harnett, Torts and Taxes, 27 N.Y.U. L. REv. 614,627 (1952).
22. See supra note 18.
23. See Hawkins v. Commissioner, 6 B.T.A. 1023, 1025 (1927). Plaintiff received
$112,000.00 in damages for defamation. The court ruled that the payment was not taxable
because this type of compensation added nothing to the individual but simply attempted to
put him in the same position that he was in before suffering the injury. Id.
24. Income Tax-Proceeds of Accident Insurance Policy, 31 Op. Att'y Gen. 304
(1918).
[T]he proceeds of an accident insurance policy are not "gains or profits and in
come" as these terms are defined by the Supreme Court. Without affirming that
the human body is in a technical sense the "capital" invested in an accident pol
icy, in a broad, natural sense the proceeds ofthe policy do but substitute, so far as
they go, capital which is the source of future periodical income. They merely take
the place of capital in human ability which was destroyed by the accident.
Id. at 308. See T.D. 2457, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 457 (1918) which agreed with the
Attorney General's opinion and added that the amount of any damages received from a
lawsuit or settlement also should be excluded from gross income. See generally Note, The
Taxability of Punitive Damages, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 1052, 1055-64 (1953).
See also H.R. REp. No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1918).
Under present law, it is doubtful whether amounts received through accident or
health insurance or under workmen's compensation acts, as compensation for
personal injury or sickness, and damages received on account of such injuries or
sickness are required to be included in gross income. The proposed bill provides
that such amounts shall not be included in gross income.
Id.
25. 26 U.S.C. § 22(b)(5) (1939), amended by 26 U.S.C. § 105 (1982), stated:
p
SEC. 22 GROSS INCOME
(b) EXCLUSIONS FROM GROSS INCOME-The following items shall not be
included in gross income and shall be exempt from taxation under this chapter:

•••

(5) COMPENSATION FOR INJURIES OR SICKNESS-Amounts received through
accident or health insurance or under workmen's compensation acts, as compen
sation for personal injuries or sickness, plus the amount of any damages received
whether by suit or agreement on account of such injuries or sickness.
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as "insurance," and a conflict arose as to what would satisfy the "in
surance" requirement of the exclusion provision. 26 The· basis of the
conflict was whether the "insurance or health plan" had to be under
written by an outside insurance carrier.27 This insurance issue became
a major source of confusion in the late 1930's and early 1940's, when
large-scale employers began instituting their own "in-house" health
plans. 28 Instead of paying large premiums to outside insurance carri
ers for employee-disability coverage, companies would generate the
necessary disability payments from their own· resources, a practice
which proved to be more economically efficient from the employers'
viewpoint.29
These new in-house plans posed a problem for the IRS: did the
statutory definition of "insurance" require an outside insurance car
rier's financial support? The IRS vacillated for an entire decade, at
one point holding that it did not,30 at other times holding that it did. 31
In 1943, the IRS stated that it would determine what constituted an
insurance plan32 by examining various criteria on a case-by-case ba
sis. 33 Thus, an employer-insured plan that included the appropriate
Id. (emphasis added).
26. See Epmeier v. United States, 199 F.2d 508 (7th Cir. 1952); LT. 4107, 1952-2
C.B. 73; LT. 4000,1950-1 C.B. 21; accord I.T. 4015,1950-1 C.B. 23; LT. 4060,1951-2 C.B.
11; Bureau of Internal Revenue News Release IR-53-047 (March 26, 1953), reprinted in
[1953] 5 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 116136.
27. See I.T. 4107, 1952-2 C.B. 73; LT. 4000, 1950-1 C.B. 21; accord I.T. 4015, 1950
1 C.B. 23; LT. 4060,1951-2 C.B. 11; Bureau ofIntemal Revenue News Release IR~53-047
(March 26, 1953), reprinted in [1953] 5 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 11 6136. See also
Seligman, 1954 Code resolves many practical problems in taxation a/sickness. accident bene
fits, 3 J. TAX'N 322, 330-31 (1955).
28. See generally Forty Topics Pertaining to the General Revision a/the Internal Reve
nue Code. 1953: Hearings on H.R. 8300 Be/ore the House 0/ Representatives Committee on
Ways and Means, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 364-73 (1953), reprinted in 3 INTERNAL REVENUE
ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES: THE REVENUE ACT OF 1954 WITH LEGISLATIVE HISTO
RIES AND CONGRESSIONAL DOCUMENTS 364-73 (1982) (statement of Clifton W. Phelan,
President, Michigan Bell Telephone Co.). Mr. Phelan stated that "in-house" plans were
more attractive to large employers from a cost-benefit standpoint. He expressed dissatisfac
tion with the discrimination in favor of insured plans, which further discriminate against
those employees receiving benefits. To force companies with self-insured disability plans to
buy commercial insurance would increase costs thereby increasing prices, creating an over
all negative effect on the economy. Id.
29. Id.
30. I.T. 4000, 1950-1 C.B. 21; accord LT. 4015, 1950-1 C.B. 23; I.T. 4060, 1951-2
C.B. 11.
31. I. T. 4107, 1952-2 C.B. 7~. See also B.LR. Release (March 26, 1953) 53-5 (CCH)
Fed. Tax Serv., 11 6136.
32. Gen. Couns. Mem. 23,511, C.B. 1943-1, 86.
33. Id. In its ruling, the IRS suggested that determinative factors in its analysis
would include employee contributions to the "plan" in question, enforceable rights and
obligations of the employees, determinable benefits based on the degree of disability rather
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elements would qualify as an "insured plan." After reaffirming its
1943 interpretation in 1950 and 1951,34 the IRS ruled, in 1952, that an
employer's self-insured plan could not qualify as "insurance" under
section 22(b)(5) if the plan was not established under a contract with
an insurance carrier.35 Benefits received under such a plan could not
be excluded under section 22(b)(5).36
In the face of this confusion, the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap
peals, in 1952, issued the first judicial interpretation of the statutory
term "insurance." In Epmeier v. United States,37 the court ruled that,
even though there was no formal contract of insurance, payments
made by an employer to an employee for disabilities would be eligible
for exclusion. 38 The court reasoned that the insurance requirement is
satisfied if one party has assumed the duty and risk of compensating
another should that other party suffer a 10ss,39 and that the statute
does not require a formal, written insurance agreement. 4O The Ep
meier court stated that its decision was consistent with what Congress
envisioned when it enacted this exclusion statute. 41
In 1953, confusion and uncertainty remained as to what would
qualify as insurance under section 22(b)(5) of the 1939 Code. There
were conflicting revenue rulings and an appeals court case holding
that the insurance requirement could be satisfied when the employer
did not have a written contract with an insurance ca~er.42 In an
than on the length of service and amount of salary and whether a separate fund earmarked
for such benefits existed. [d. at 88.
34. I.T. 4000, 1950-1 C.B. 21; accord I.T. 4015, 1950-1 C.B. 23; I.T. 4060, 1951-2
C.B. 11.
35. I.T. 4107, 1952-2 C.B. 73, 74.
36. [d.
37. 199 F.2d 508 (7th Cir. 1952).
38. Epmeier, 199 F.2d at 511. This view ultimately was endorsed by the Supreme
Court in Haynes v. United States, 353 U.S. 81 (1957). The Court observed that "[b]roadly
speaking, health insurance is an undertaking by one person for reasons satisfactory to him
to indemnify another for losses caused by illness." [d. at 83.
39. Epmeier, 199 F.2d at 510. See also Herbkersman v. United States, 133 F. Supp.
495 (S.D. Ohio 1955) (under a disability plan, risk of loss of income is transferred to the
employer during periods of disability which makes in itself a contract of insurance); Haynes
v. United States, 139 F. Supp. 671, 674 (N.D. Ga. 1955) (employer becomes the insurer and
benefits are paid only when the employee is iII), rev'd, 233 F.2d 413 (5th Cir. 1956), rev'd,
353 U.S. 81 (1957).
.
40. Epmeier, 199 F.2d at 510.
41. [d. at 511. The court stated that "[t]he provisions of Section 22(b)(5) undoubt
edly were intended to relieve a taxpayer who has the misfortune to become iII or injured, of
the necessity of paying income tax upon insurance benefits received to combat the ravages
of disease or accident." [d. See supra text accompanying note 17.'
42. See supra notes
30-41 and accompanying text.
,
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early example of non-acquiescence,43 the Commissioner of the IRS re
fused to accept the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals' decision as bind
ing on the Service outside of the Seventh Circuit's jurisdiction. 44 The
prognosis was for continued inconsistent rulings and increased
confusion. 4s
43. Nonacquiescence by the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service dates
back to the Revenue Act of 1924 which created the Board of Tax Appeals. This Board was
the predecessor to the Tax Court. Dwan,· Administrative Review of Judicial Decisions:
Treasury Practice, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 581, 593 (1946). Although the Commissioner is
bound by rulings of the United States Supreme Court, he or she must follow lower tax
court rulings only with respect to the party involved in the particular suit and can disregard
these rulings as precedent. Divine v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 152, 159 (1972). Thus, the
Commissioner's nonacquiescence does not signal an appeal by the government; instead, it
simply indicates that the IRS will maintain its original position on the issue, despite Tax
Court and courts of appeals' rulings to the contrary. Carter, Commissioner's Nonacquies
cence; A Case for a National Court of Tax Appeals, 59 TEMP. L.Q. 879, 882 (1986). As a
result of recent litigation, the Commissioner must release to the public internal documents
used by the IRS to explain to IRS personnel its position on district court, United States
Claims Court, United States Court of Appeals and Tax Court Memorandum decisions.
Taxation with Representation Fund v. IRS, 646 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1981). These internal
documents are called Action on Decisions. See Carter, supra, at 883 n.20.
Some commentators have attacked the policy of nonacquiescence by the Commis
sioner on the grounds that it is an encroachment upon the judiciary by the executive branch
and, as such, violates the concept of separation of powers established in Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Note, Administrative Agency Intracircuit Nonac
quiescence, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 582, 595-604 (1985). See also Herzberg, Blueprint ofa Fair
Tax Administration, 41 TAXES 161 (1963). Others have argued that the policy is violative
of the principles of equity, see Rodgers, The Commissioner "Does Not Acquiesce", 59 NEB.
L. REV. 1001, 1030-31 (1980), uniformity, see Comment, The Commissioner's Nonacquies
cence, 40 S. CAL. L. REV. 550, 553 (1967), and certainty, id. at 559. While commentators
generally disapprove of nonacquiescence, it may be an appropriate response to certain
problems, such as uncertainty of venue, Note, Administrative Agency Intracircuit Nonacqui
escence, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 582, 604 (1985), subsequent intercircuit contlict, id. at 605,
and a pending review by the Supreme Court, id. at 606. See also The Commissioner's
nonacquiescences: their effect upon tax planning, 28 J. TAX'N 57 (1968); Note, Administra
tive Law-Jurisdiction. Class Action. Injunctive Relief and Nonacquiescence-Lopez v.
Heckler. 104 S. Ct. 221 (1984), 7 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 277 (1984) (providing an analysis
of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' condemnation of Social Security Administration
nonacquiescence).
44. See Bureau of Internal Revenue News Release IR-53-047 (March 26, 1953), re
printed in [1953] 5 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 11 6136. The IRS argued that when Con
gress enacted § 22(b)(5) in 1939, provision for compensation of permanent injuries was
made by individuals purchasing policies from insurance companies with after-tax dollars.
However, since 1939, employers have provided their own plans for employees. Therefore,
"the Bureau deem[ed] that it was the intention of Congress that only payments which are
truly 'insurance' payments should be excluded ... under section 22(b)(5) of the Code." [d.
See supra note 43 for a discussion of the Commissioner's nonacquiescence.
45. Seligman, supra note 27, at 332. The IRS' refusal to accept the Epmeier decision
might have been justified if the IRS had a definitive policy which contradicted the decision.
However, it did not. This is evidenced by the fact that Treasury Regulations III and 118,
the official regulations that have interpreted the Code since 1942, contain no reference to
§ 22(b)(5). Id.
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In 1954, therefore, during the major recodification ofthe Internal
Revenue Code, the time was right for Congress to resolve the conflict
surrounding the meaning of insurance under section 22(b)(5).
B.

Enactment '0/ Section I05-Post-1954 Developments

Congress' original purpose in enacting section 105, in 1954, was
to remedy the confusion surrounding the interpretation of the insur
ance requirement contained in section 22(b)(5) of the 1939 Code. 46
However, Congress also added additional provisions in order to
achieve another goal: to limit the exclusion privilege to the truly
needy, disabled taxpayer who receives compensation because of injury
or disease. 47
Section 105 states:
AMOUNTS RECEIvim UNDER ACCIDENT AND HEALTH PLANS
(A) AMOUNTS ATTRIBUTABLE TO EMPLOYER CONTRIBU
TIONS.- Except as otherwise provided in this section, amounts re

ceived by an employee through accident or health insurance for
personal injuries or sickness shall be included in gross income to the
extent such amounts (1) are attributable to contributions by the em
ployer which were not includible in the gross income of the em
ployee, or (2) are paid by the employer.

•••

(C) PAYMENTS UNRELATED TO ABSENCE FROM WORK.

Gross income does not include amounts referred to in subsection (a)
to the extent such amounts
(1) constitute payment for the permanent loss or loss of use of
a member or function of the body, or the permanent disfigurement,
of the taxpayer, his spouse, or a dependent (as defined in section
152), and
(2) are computed with reference to the nature of the injury
without regard to the period the employee is absent from work. 48

Congress solved the "insurance" problem in a deceptively simple
manner-by agreement and not by amendment. The language which
proved to be the source of the pre-1954 confusion, "accident or health
insurance" plan, remained unchanged. However, both the House49
46.
47.

26 U.S.C. § 22(b)(S) (1939), amended by 26 U.S.C. § lOS (1982).
See supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text.

48. 26 U.S.C. § lOS (1982). Section (a) of the statute, therefore, states the rule that
benefits received through an accident or health plan shall be included in the employee's
gross income. Section (c) then provides the exception to this general rule, excluding perma
nent disability payments that meet the requirements of subsections (c)(1) and (c)(2). This
comment concentrates specifically on section (c) of § lOS.
49. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. lOS, reprinted in 19S4 U.S. CODE
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and the Senate50 Committee Reports clearly reveal a congressional in
tent that taxpayers should be able to exclude from their income, disa
bility benefits financed by employers whether paid from insured or
uninsured plans. In corresponding Treasury Regulation section 1.105
5(a), the Treasury Department defined "accident or health insurance
plan" in a manner similar to the definition expressed by the Epmeier
court. 51 Therefore, in order to satisfy the section 105(a) "accident or
health insurance" requirement, the taxpayer now must prove only that
the employer has agreed to accept responsibility for certain employee
expenses and has compensated the disabled employee for a permanent
disability.
In addition to resolving the insurance controversy, Congress ad
ded several new requirements to section 105. 52 For instance, the tax
payer must prove that the payment is "for the permanent loss or loss
of use of a member or function of the body,"53 and that the payment is
"computed with reference to the nature of the injury" and not with
reference to lost wages or salary. 54 These additional requirements fur
ther the legitimate legislative purpose of preventing taxpayers from
abusing the exclusion privilege and escaping taxation through an avail
able loophole. 55 In the floor debate over section 105, Senator Morse
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 4017, 4039 ("[The House] committee's bill grants equal tax treat
ment to sickness and accident benefits, financed by employers whether paid under insured
or noninsured plans, Such benefits are , , , excluded from tax if received as compensation
for personal injury or sickness,"), Id,
50, S, REP, No, 1622, 83d Cong" 2d Sess, 105, reprinted in 1954 U,S, CODE CONG,
& ADMIN, NEWS 4621, 4645 ("[The Senate] committee approves in principle of the general
objective of the House provision in equalizing the tax treatment of the insured and nonin
sured sickness and accident benefits,"), See also Comment, The Legal Benchmarks of a
Plan for Employees: A Navigational Framework Under Section 105, 8 LoY, L.A,L. REV,
363, 365 (1975),
51. Treas, Reg, § 1.105-5(a) (1987) provides:
In general, an accident or health plan is an arrangement for the payment of
amounts to employees in the event of personal injuries, , " An accident or health
plan may be either insured or noninsured, and it is not necessary that the plan be
in writing or that the employee's rights to benefits under the plan be enforceable,
Id,
The Treasury seems to have adopted the reasoning of the court in Epmeier v, United
States, 199 F,2d 508 (7th Cir, 1952), The Epmeier court stated that "[i]nsurance, of ancient
origin, involves a contract, whereby, for an adequate consideration, one party undertakes to
indemnify another against loss arising from certain specified contingencies or perils," Id, at
509-10, See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
52, See Morris v, Commissioner, 52 T.C.M, (CCH) 1304, 1306 (1987) ("[P]etitioners
have failed to place themselves within the statute because their payments were for services,
not for anything else, including the loss of use of a member or function of the body,"),
53, 26 U,S,C, § 105(c)(I) (1982),
54, 26 U,S,C, § 105(c)(2) (1982),
55, A "loophole" to escape taxation would be available if taxpayers simply catego
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made the point sharply: "Limitations are wise because it is my under
standing that in the past, corporation executives and other high-sala
ried employees have been able to draw the amounts of their regular
salaries as tax-exempt 'disability' benefits from special plans while on
extended vacations taken on 'doctor's orders.' "56
Added by the Senate Finance Committee57 and accepted by the
House,58 these new requirements are codified in section 105(c). 59 The
first requirement specifies that the amount received must constitute
payment for a permanent disability.60 According to Treasury Regula~
tion section 1.105-3, the Treasury defines "permanent" as that which
"may reasonably be expected to continue for the life of the
individual."61
Disability is defined by statute as "loss or loss of use of a member
or function of the body. "62 While the Treasury gives examples <:>f what
constitutes a "loss or loss of use of a member or function of the body"
in Treasury Regulation section 1.105-3,63 this regulation is general and
open-ended. 64 Because of this, the meaning of "loss of use of a mem
ber or function of the body" is still litigated, as a later section of this
note documents. 65
The second major restriction, added in 1954, requires the pay
ments to be "computed with reference to the nature of the injury with
out regard to the period that the employee has been absent from
work."66 This requirement prevents the taxpayer from doing what
rized pension plan funds or sick-day credits as disability payments upon receipt. However,
such a "loophole" is eliminated by the various requirements imposed by Congress through
§ 105(c), the courts, and the IRS.
56. 100 CONGo REC. 9,323 (June 30, 1954) (statement of Sen. Morse).
57. S. REp. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 105, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONGo
& ADMIN. NEWS 4623.
58. H.R. REP. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 105, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 5280, 5284.
59. For the language of section 105(c), see supra text accompanying note 48.
60. 26 U.S.C. § 105(c)(I) (1982).
61. See Treas. Reg. § 1.105-3 (1987).
62. 26 U.S.C. § 105(c)(I) (1982). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.105-3 (1987) which states:
For purposes of section 105(c), loss or loss of use of a member or function of the
body includes the loss or loss of use of an appendage of the body, the loss of an
eye, the loss of substantially all of the vision of an eye, and the loss of substan
tially all of the hearing in one or both ears.
Id. (emphasis added).
63. Id.
64. By the use of the word "include" in Treasury Regulation § 1.105-3, the IRS
intended the examples provided to be illustrative rather than all-inclusive.
65. See infra notes 102-30 and accompanying text.
66. 26 U.S.C. § 105(c)(2) (1982).
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Senator Morse feared: disguising wages or deferred compensation as
disability benefits and, undeservedly, obtaining the exclusion privilege
of section 105. 67
Thus, the difficulty and uncertainty surrounding section 22(b)(5)
of the 1939 Code was eliminated, not by altering the language which
was the source of the confusion, but by means of the legislative history
in which Congress expressed its wish to have uniform treatment of
accident and health insurance plans.
In addition, Congress, through section 105(c), included certain
requirements which the taxpayer must meet in order to exclude bene
fits from gross income. These requirements express Congress' desire
that only those who suffer permanent disabilities should be able to use
the exclusion. Since 1954, the courts and the IRS, at times, have inter
preted these requirements to legitimately effectuate Congress' intent.
However, there have been instances where the courts and the IRS
overstepped the boundaries which Congress created in 1954.
III.

JUDICIAL AND IRS INTERPRETATIONS OF SECTION 105
STANDARD ApPLICATIONS

While the statute has remained unchanged since its enactment in
1954, its interpretation by the IRS and the courts has been ever-chang
ing. The following subsections review IRS and judicial applications of
section 105(c)'s plan and permanent loss requirements. The cases
presented in this section exemplify proper and legitimate interpreta
tions of the congressional intent underlying section 105(c). However,
as illustrated by Hines v. Commissioner,68 there still exists the danger
of applying an approach which exceeds the bounds of judicial discre
tion defined by Congress when it enacted section 105(c). Section IV of
this note presents a recent Ninth Circuit case in which the court of
appeals applied the statutory requirements in an overly restrictive
manner. 69
A.

Caplin v. United States-HA Plan"

In Caplin v. United States,70 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit developed an approach for determining when
an accident or health insurance plan exists for purposes of section
67. See supra text accompanying note 56.
68. 72 T.C. 715 (1979). See infra notes 102-30 and accompanying text.
69. Beisler v. Commissioner, 814 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1987). For a detailed discus
sion of this case, see infra notes 137-70 and accompanying text. .
70. 718 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1983).
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105(c). In Caplin, a person employed by the same company for thirty
eight years71 was forced to retire due to severe neurofibroma-"a neu
rological impairment causing the loss of use of the limbs."72 At the
time of his forced retirement, petitioner received $305,815.97, the total
amount in his account in his employer's profit-sharing plan. 73 Peti
tioner reported the payment as income on his return and then filed a
claim for a refund which the IRS denied. 74 On appeal, the petitioner
contended that his employer's profit-sharing plan served a "dual-pur
pose" of a profit-sharing plan and an accident or health insurance
plan. 75
The Caplin court noted that there is a significant difference be
tween a profit-sharing plan and an accident or health insurance plan. 76
The court stated that simply "changing the labels attached to the pay
ments at the time the payments are made" was not enough to fulfill
the requirements for the exclusion of income under section 105(c). 77
Profit-sharing plans are to reward employees, and the amount in each
account depends solely on the financial success of the company and
the individual employee's position within the company. Alternatively,
accident and health plans protect employees and their beneficiaries78
from accident and health risks. 79 Regardless of the fortunes of the
company or the employee's "rank" within the company, benefits for
disability compensation always will be available. 80
Referring to the structure of section 105, the Caplin court noted
that the threshold question, prior to addressing any section 105(c) is
sues, is whether a "plan" exists. 81 Acknowledging that Treasury Reg
ulation section 1.105-5 is general and allows virtually everything to
71. Id. at 545.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 547.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 548.
77. Id.
78. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 203 (3d ed. 1976) de
fines "beneficiary" as "the person named (as in an insurance or annuity policy) as the one
who is to receive proceeds or benefits accruing." Id.
79. Caplin, 718 F.2d at 548.
80. Presumably in recognition of these and other differences, Congress has enacted
an entirely different section pertaining to profit-sharing plans. See 26 U.S.C. § 402 (1982).
81. Caplin, 718 F.2d at 547. 26 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1982) states:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, amounts received by an employee
through an accident or health insurance plan for personal injuries or sickness
shall be included in gross income to the extent such amounts (I) are attributable
to contributions by the employer which were not includible in the gross income of
the employee, or (2) are paid by the employer.
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qualify as an accident or health plan,82 the court decided to formulate
its own guidelines to determine whether a plan actually is an accident
or health plan for purposes of section 105. 83
In searching for the plan's true purpose,84 the Caplin court
looked for the following general indicia: (1) a preamble to the plan
which states that its purpose is to qualify as an accident or health
plan;8s (2) an announcement that the benefits payable under the plan
are eligible for tax exclusion;86 (3) a statement that the plan will reim
burse the employee for certain medical expenses incurred;87 and (4) a
schedule listing pre-determined amounts of compensation for specific
injuries incurred, such as loss of a leg or an arm. 88 While the court
emphasized that including these provisions in a plan does not guaran
tee that it qualifies as an accident or he~lth plan, their absence "plainly
militates" against finding that the plan in question serves as an acci
dent or health plan. 89 In Caplin, the court held that the benefits re
ceived by the petitioner were not eligible for exclusion under section
105(c) because the indicia were not presen~, and, therefore, the plan
failed to qualify as an accident or health insurance plan. 9O Instead, the
plan resembled a profit-sharing plan for employees of the company.91
Both the holding and the reasoning of the Caplin court faithfully
serve the intent of Congress in enacting section 105. 92 Its judicial
Id. See also American Foundry v. Commissioner, 536 F.2d 289 (9th Cir. 1976);
Larkin v. Commissioner, 394 F.2d 494 (1st Cir. 1968); Kaufman v. Commissioner, 300
F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1962); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8,728,031 (Apr. 13,1987); Comment, Taxation of
Employee Accident and Health Plans Before and Under the 1954 Code, 64 YALE L.J. 222,
231 (1954) ("[I]f an arrangement fails to constitute a 'plan for employees,' the exemptions
granted by ... [Section] 105 will be lost unless the arrangement independently qualifi:es as
'insurance.' ") Id. (citation omitted).
82. Caplin, 718 F.2d at 549. See also American Foundry, 536 F.2d at 293.
83. Caplin, 718 F.2d at 549. See infra notes 85-101 and accompanying text.
84. Caplin, 718 F.2d at 549. See also Sidman v. United States, 336 F. Supp. 474
(S.D.N.Y. 1971). The court stated that, "[a]t the least, a 'plan' must contain the general
indicia of insurance - that is, a contract by which one party undertakes to indemnify
another against loss arising from an unknown or contingent event." Id. at 476 (citation
omitted).
85. Caplin, 718 F.2d at 549.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. The Caplin court is not the only court to faithfully adhere to the congressional
intent underlying § 105 and question whether the plan which generated the payments is
truly an accident or health insurance plan. See American Foundry v. Commissioner, 536
F.2d 289 (9th Cir. 1976); Larkin v. Commissioner, 394 F.2d 494 (1st Cir. 1968); Kaufman
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skepticism reflects well-grounded congressional concerns. Many plans
are not accident or health plans but suddenly transform into such
when the taxpayer attempts. to exclude payments under section
105(c).93 To "rubber-stamp" all payments made after a disability
would open the door to substantial abuse of the privilege. Significant
dividends or deferred compensation could be transferred tax-free in
the form of putative health or disability benefits,94 which Congress did
not intend when it enacted section 105(c).95
.The Caplin decision created what appropriately is known as the
"Caplin analysis," which courts and the IRS now employ in determin
ing what qualifies as an accident' or health plan. 96 This analysis is
v. Commissioner, 300 F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1962); Bogene, Inc. v. Commissioner, 27 T.C.M.
(CCH) 730 (1968); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8,728,031 (Apr. 13, 1987).
93. Caplin, 718 F.2d at 548.
94. American Foundry, 536 F.2d at 293.
.'
95. See S; REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 4621,4645; see also Hines V. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 715, 718-19
(1979) ("The intent was to provide a tax benefit to one who receives a severe physical injury
which permanently and significantly lessens the quality of life which he had enjoyed prior
to the injury.").
.
.
Treas. Reg. § 1.105-5(a) (1987) states ~hat the plan does not have to be transcribed but
also can be oral. With this in mind, and the fact that the "Caplin analysis" and its exami
nation of various indicia can be applied only to written plans, there also are requirements
for the informal, unwritten plan. Essentially, courts will search for an established practice
or custom within the business which has the effect of a plan. For instance, the court may
examine whether it is stated in the corporate minutes, Bogene, Inc. V. Commissioner, 27
T.C.M. (CCH) 730, 7~3 (1968), whether the employee knew of the plan's existence before
payments were made, Greer V. Commissioner, 70 T.e. 294 (1978), or whether it has been
the employer's practice in the past to pay employees who incur serious injuries or disabili
ties, Estate of Kaufman v. Commissioner, 35 T.e. 663 (1961), aff'd, 300 F.2d 128 (6th Cir.
1962); see also Greer, 70 T.C. at 301 (because the use of corporate aircraft for medical
reasons was available to all employees of the corporation and requests for such use never
had been denied, "a 'policy or custom' existed which had the effect of [a] plan.") [d. Ab
sent such instances, the courts are extremely reluctant to find that there is a plan. See
Larkin V. Commissioner, 394 F.2d 494 (1st Cir. 1968).
96. See supra note 95. See Rosen v. United States, 646 F. Supp. 97 (W.O. Va. 1986),
rev'd, 829 F.2d 506 (4th Cir.1987). In Rosen, the petitioner was employed as an executive
for Warner Communications, Inc. Shortly after commencing work with Warner, the tax
payer suffered a horse-riding accident, resulting in serious physical and neurological dam
age that prevented him from ever returning to work. [d. at 508. His employment contract
with Warner contained a specific provision outlining the terms of benefits that the peti
tioner would receive in the circumstance of permanent injuries and inability to function in
an executive capacity with the company. [d. Due to the severity of his injuries, the peti
tioner qualified for payments under the provision and received payments of $282,550.00 in
1977 and $183,691.44 in 1978. Rosen, 646 F. Supp. at 98. The petitioner paid taxes on
these amounts and then filed a claim for a refund, maintaining that the payments were
excludible under § 105(c). The IRS denied the refund claim and the taxpayer brought suit
in district court. Rosen, 829 F.2d at 508. The district court ruled that the compensation
received by the petitioner qualified for exclusion under § 105, stating that the § 105 deter
mination rests upon the actual disability incurred and not upon the terms of the underlying
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fairly simple for the IRS to apply and for the taxpayer and employer
to satisfy. The plan must state that it serves as an accident and health
plan,97 that the benefits are excludible from gross income,98 that medi
cal expenses related to the injury are covered by the plan,99 and that
an accompanying schedule relates payments to the nature of the in
jury.lOO These "indicators" are clear, easy to follow, and faithful to
the congressional purpose. 101
B.

Hines v. Commissioner-"Function of the Body"

Section 105 (c)(l) requires that the payment from a qualified plan
must be for the "permanent loss or loss of use of a member or function
of the body."102 Although the ','permanent loss or loss of use of ,a
plan. Rosen, 646 F. Supp. at 99. In the view of the district court, where the triggering event
leading to the distribution of benefits is a permanent disability, the entire distribution is
eligible for exclusion under § 105, regardless ofthe terms of the underlying plan. Id. at 100.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, stating that the lower court's analysis
"generally ignored the significance of the governing agreement in determining 'whether pay
ments were excludible under section 105(c)." Rosen, 829 F.2d at 509. While admitting
that the permanency of the disability must be considered, the court emphasized that this
was not the determinative factor. Instead, reaffirming Caplin, the court held that the plan
requirement that the payment come from an accident or health insurance plan first must be
satisfied. Id. The court of appeals concluded that the petitioner's plan failed to satisfy this
requirement in several ways. First, the contract provided benefits only if the employee was
absent from work for a six-month period. Id. at 510. It contained no requisite that the
injury be permanent, and it failed to contain a schedule of payments which would reflect
the nature of the injury. Id. Thus, although the payments were for the permanent injuries
suffered by the petitioner, they were not excludible under § 105(c) because they did not
come from an accident or health plan.
See a/so Gordon v. Commissioner, 88 T.e. 630 (1987). Relying upon the analysis
established in Caplin, the Tax Court denied the petitioner's claim because the profit-sharing
plan in question failed to include any of the indicia qualifying it as a dual-purpose plan. Id.
at 638-40. See a/so Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8,728,031 (Apr. 13, 1987). Applying the "Caplin analy
sis," the IRS refused to allow a § 105(c) exclusion 6f benefits because the plan failed to state
a goal to provide health care and security for employees and failed to provide specific com
pensation for certain injuries. Further, the employee's absence from work also was requi
site to receiving payments. Therefore, the IRS determined that the plan was not a dual
purpose plan, and the benefits generated from it could not be excluded from gross income.
Id.
97. Caplin, 718 F.2d at 549.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. As stated in Caplin, inclusion of these various indicia by no means automati
cally qualifies the plan's benefits for e~clusion .. However, the absence of these indicia is a
clear signal to the court that an appropriate plan does not in fact exist. Id.
102. 26 U.S.C. § 105(c)(I) (1982); see Laverty v. Commissiorier, 61 T.C. 160 (1973).
The " 'loss or loss of use of a member or function of the body' must be the cause of the
payment." Id. at 167 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 105 (c)(1) (1982».

a
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member" is well understood,103 the meaning of loss of use of a "func
tion of the body" is less clear. Given the lack of a statutory defini
tion,l04 an unhelpful legislative history, lOS and an inadequate Treasury
Regulation,106 the IRS and the courts have defined "loss of function"
on a case-by-case basis. 107 The test which has evolved from these deci
sions is questionable, leading one to inquire whether there can be a
viable definition for "loss of body function."
In Revenue Ruling 63-181,108 petitioner, terminally ill with can
cer, was forced to retire and received disability benefits. 100 Relying on
competent medical authority, the IRS permitted him to exclude these
benefits because his disease resulted in the complete loss of all bodily
functions. 1 10 The IRS noted that when determining whether pay
ments qualify for exclusion, all of the facts and circumstances of each
case must be considered. I l l As later court decisions show, however,
expert medical opinion proving loss of body function is, in and of it
self, insufficient to satisfy section 105(c)(I).1l2 The taxpayer also must
prove that the lost "function" was a significant one, upon which he or
she heavily relied. In Hines v. Commissioner,l13 a commercial airline
pilot suffered a heart attack and consequently his commercial pilot's
103. BLACK'S LAW DICfIONARY 887 (5th ed. 1979) defines "member" as "[a] part
or organ of the body; especially a limb or other separate part." Id. See California Casualty
Indem. Exch. v. Industrial Accident Comm. of Cal., 13 Cal. 2d 529, 531-33, 90 P.2d 289,
290-91 (1939) (court held that eye-glasses were not artificial "members" of the body and,
therefore, injury to them is not compensable under workmen's compensation acts).
104. See 26 U.S.C. § 105(c)(I) (1982).
105. See supra notes 49-50, 56-58 and accompanying text.
106. Treas. Reg. § 1.105-3 (1987) states:
For purposes of section 105(c), loss or loss of use of a member or function of the
body includes the loss or loss of use of an appendage of the body, the loss of an
eye, the loss of substantially all of the vision of an eye, and the loss of substan
tially all of the hearing in one or both ears.
Id. (emphasis added).
107. See Watts v. United States, 703 F.2d 346, 350 (9th Cir. 1983) ("[W]hether the
section 105(c) exemption applies to payments received by an employee depends upon all the
facts and circumstances in each case."). Id. (citing Rev. Rul. 63-181, 1963-2 C.B. 74, 75).
108. Rev. Rul. 63-181, 1963-2 C.B. 74.
109. Id.
110. Id. The medical expert consulted in this particular case stated that petitioner'S
cancer gave him a life expectancy of only a few months and was so acute that it rendered
him totally disabled. Id. at 74-76.
11 I. Id. at 75.
112. See Watts v. United States, 703 F.2d 346 (9th Cir. 1983). In Watts, the peti
tioner submitted an affidavit of his personal physician stating that his "loss" constituted a
loss of body function. The court ruled this was insufficient and that petitioner must estab
lish a permanent loss of body function. Id. at 352-53. See also Hines v. Commissioner, 72
T.C. 715 (1979). See infra notes 117-34.
113. 72 T.C. 715 (1979).
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license was revoked. 114 The petitioner received benefits from his em
ployer's disability plan l15 which he attempted to exclude from his
gross income under section 105(c).116 To show that the payment was
for the "permanent loss ... of a function of the body," petitioner
presented expert medical opinion that his heart attack destroyed mus
cle tissue and that part of the heart's function was lost permanently. 117
The Tax Court denied his claim stating that Hines' liberal (and literal)
interpretation of the word "function" would "circumvent the purpose
of the statute,"118 which is to provide some form of relief to the person
who suffers a serious physical injury which significantly affects the
quality of life enjoyed prior to the injury.119
In adopting a restrictive definition of "loss of body function," the
IRS and the courts distinguish between loss of body function and loss
of work function. It is not enough for the taxpayer to establish a per
manent loss of body function. Instead, he or she also must show an
inability to perform in the same capacity as prior to the injury, and
that it is an injury which is serious enough to affect his or her lifestyle
adversely.120 As one court stated, "[i]t is quite possible for one to lose
the capacity to function in a particular work setting without one's
body losing the capacity to function in some manner."121 The Hines
court emphasized the fact that the petitioner continued to live a nor
mal Hfe, 122 and simply because he could not continue as a commercial
airline pilot did not mean. that he could not engage in other gainful
activity. 123
114. J.d. at 716. "[Federal Aviation Administration] regulations permanently dis
qualify an individual for the position of pilot if he has a history of heart attack, irrespective
of the degree of recovery and subsequent freedom·from symptoms." Id.
115. Id. To be eligible for benefits under the employer's disability plan, a pilot mem
ber must be incapacitated for fourteen consecutive months. An incapacitated member was
defined in the plan as having a physical or mental disability or condition such that he was
unable to hold an FAA medical certificate needed to serve in the capacity and status in
which he was serving at the time of the incapacity. Id.
116. Id. at 716.
117. Id. Petitioner's personal physician also stated that petitioner was highly suscep
tible to another, more severely disabling heart attack. Id.
118. Id. at 719.
119. Id. at 718-19.
120. Id. at 719. See infra notes 123-28 and accompanying text.
121. Watts v. United States, 703 F.2d 346, 352 (9th Cir. 1983).
122. Hines, 72 T.C. at 719.
123. Id. at 720. See also Watts v. United States, 703 F.2d 346 (9th Cir. 1983), in
which the petitioner was forced to retire from his job due to high blood pressure and exces
sive hypertension, and then attempted to exclude the benefits that he received at his retire-,
ment. The court rejected his claim stating that he may have lost that particular work
function but he still was able to engage in other work where the pressure would not be so
great and the petitioner's symptoms would not be aggravated. Id. at 351-52.
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In an attempt to formulate a test to determine what qualifies as a
"function of the body," judicial and IRS decisions 124 are consistent
with the congressional intent underlying section 105; all have a restric
tive interpretation which prevents those suffering a minor injury from
benefiting from a privilege reserved for those suffering serious physical
injuries. 12S However, this analysis is inconsistent with Congress' in
tent when it enacted the original exclusion statute, section 213(b)(6) in
1918,126 to provide some form of relief to those who experience pain
and suffering as a result of sustaining permanent injuries. 127 The re
sult is that this particular "function" test is unpredictable and, at
times, may be violative of congressional intent.
The "function" test established by the Tax Court in Hines is
proper in that it will preclude the taxpayer with the very minor injury
from escaping taxation through a loophole. For example, a person
who loses her small toe in an accident is still capable of walking and
running and is not hindered in any significant way. Section 105(c) was
not intended to provide for her. However, the test disserves the origi
nal purpose of the statute by preventing a taxpayer with a more signifi
cant injury from excluding disability benefits from gross income. In
Hines, the court denied the petitioner's claim because the loss of mus
cle tissue did not adversely affect his lifestyle, and he still possessed the
ability to pursue gainful employment in some other area. 128 Granted,
Hines is able to pursue other employment, but the additional require
ment that the loss must "adversely affect" the taxpayer's lifestyle is
inconsistent with the interpretative scheme which Congress envisioned
when it enacted the first exclusion statute in 1918. Congress added
these requirements in 1954 to restrict the use of section 105 for pur
poses of preserving it. Yet, to interpret these new requirements to
mean that the injured taxpayer's lifestyle must be adversely affected in
order to exclude disability benefits from gross income restricts the use
of section 105 far beyond what Congress had intended. If the Hines
court was somehow fearful of potential abuse of the exclusion privi
124. See Watts v. United States, 703 F.2d 346 (9th Cir. 1983); Hines v. Commis
sioner, 72 T.C. 715 (1979); Berner v. United States, 81-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) § 88,468;
Rev. Rul. 63-181, 1963-2 C.B. 74.
125. See supra notes 52-67 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 17-24 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
128. Hines, 72 T.C. at 719-20; see also Watts, 703 F.2d at 352. ("It is quite possible
for one to lose the capacity to function in a particular setting without one's body losing the
capacity to function in some manner. The terms 'work' and 'body' simply are not synony
mous-they have different definitions.").

198

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 11:179

lege, the requirements added by Congress in 1954 ensure that taxpay
ers cannot take unfair advantage of section 105(c).
In Hines, subsequent to his attack, the petitioner was no longer
eligible to be licensed as a commercial airline pilot. 129 The Tax Court
stated that the petitioner's loss was minor and that he could continue
to live a normal life and pursue other means of employment, conclud
ing that the loss would not have an adverse effect upon his lifestyle. 130
Yet, in a profession such as his, there is a significant chance that such
a loss would have an adverse effect upon his lifestyle. For purposes of
showing the approach's fallibility, assume that Hines' annual salary as
an airline pilot was $120,000.00. Unable to pilot again, he is now re
quired to search for new employment. Based on his previous work
experience, he might be qualified for the position of cargo dispatcher
which may pay an annual salary of $30,000.00. Undoubtedly, to be
forced into such a position would have a serious effect upon the life
style which the taxpayer previously enjoyed, forcing him to adapt to
an entirely new lifestyle due to a significant decrease in income.
As another example, consider the case of a surgeon specializing in
a field requiring a significant amount of training and expertise. If the
surgeon suffered some type of permanent nerve damage to her hands,
depriving her of only a slight degree of manual dexterity, she likely
would be forced to retire from surgery. Under the Hines approach,
she could not exclude the disability benefits received under an accident
or health plan because the injury would be deemed comparatively mi
nor and the physician would be able to operate a diagnostic medical
practice. From the physician's standpoint, however, the relatively mi
nor loss of nerve function is absolutely devastating, signifying the loss
of a skill which took years to acquire and master, forcing retirement
from one's chosen work, and causing a significant loss of future in
come. Therefore, injuries which may appear minor to a court apply
ing the Hines test may be major injuries to the taxpayer, the person
section 105 is intended to serve.
The inequitable consequences which may result from applying
the Hines approach exemplify the difficulties of formulating an ap
proach which consistently can be true to both the general purpose of
the exclusion privilege, to provide for those who suffer a permanent
disability, and the specific purpose of section 105(c), to restrict the use
of the exclusion and to preserve it for those whom it was intended to
serve. The Hines approach will be true to the specific purpose in every
129. Hines, 72 T.e. at 716.
130. Id. at 719-20.
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instance because it will effectively weed out fraudulent claims. How
ever, in certain instances, the Hines court's myopic view of what con
stitutes an injury adverse to one's lifestyle may prevent the fair
application of section l05(c) to disability benefits. Hence, the courts
may violate the general purpose by preventing a taxpayer who is ex
periencing pain and suffering from excluding from gross income any
disability benefits that he or she receives.
Although the holding in Hines may be incorrect, the approach
which the Hines court formulated is a step in the right direction. The
goal is to build from this approach and to formulate an analysis which
can serve both purposes of section 105 in every instance. Considering
the individual factors involved in each case, it appears that a uniform
"function of the body" test would be impossible to effectuate, because
it would discriminate against some claimants with legitimate injuries.
Thus, the solution to the problem is to analyze each of these individual
factors carefully, a solution that will consume both time and money
but which is necessary to administer section 105 properly.
C.

Section 105(c)(2)-"Computed With Reference to the Nature of
the Injury"

Subsection (c)(2) of section 105 presents the final requirements
which the taxpayer must satisfy in order to exclude disability benefits
from gross income. This subsection requires that the payments made
to the disabled taxpayer must be computed: (1) "with reference to the
nature of the injury," and (2) "without regard to the period the em
ployee is absent from work."l31 The purpose of these two require
ments is to prevent the taxpayer from excluding those payments which
actually. are compensation for lost wages and not compensation for
permanent disabilities. Thus, subsection(c)(2) plays an important role
in properly restricting the use of the exclusion to those who receive
compensation as a result of a permanent disability.
The second requirement of section 105(c)(2), that "payments
must not be computed with regard to the employee's absence from
work,"132 means that payment of the benefits cannot be conditional
upon the employee's not returning to work. l33 A plan that pays bene
131. 26 U.S.C. § 105(c)(2) (1982).
132. Hines, 72 T.C. at 720.
133. See In re Maller, 53 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (P-H) § 84,614, at 84-2497 (1984);
Christensen v. United States, 86-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 11 9254 (D. Minn. 1986); see also Rev. Rul.
74-603, 1974-2 C.B. 35. In Christensen, the petitioner, who was 50 years old, was forced to
retire because of total blindness. Under his employer's accident and health plan, he was
offered a lump-sum payment in lieu of the remaining payments he was to receive until he
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fits only if the employee stays out of work fails this test because the
payments are contingent upon the employee's period of absence from
work. 134
Section 105(c)(2) also requires that the benefits must vary accord
ing to the type of injury received. 13s To satisfy this subsection, the
accident or health plan must use different benefit scales to determine
the amount of benefits available for differing injuries. 136
Section 105(c)(2) prohibits the taxpayer from excluding benefits
which may, in reality, be compensation for lost wages or a payment
from a profit-sharing plan. Thus, this part of the statute is integral in
achieving Congress' desire that the taxpayer only be allowed to ex
clude benefits received because of a permanent disability. ~owever,
strict judicial and IRS interpretations of this section of the statute
present some difficulties.
reached the age of 65. The petitioner accepted the payment. The IRS held that the pay
ment was not excludible because it was "computed with reference to the period taxpayer
would be absent from work. Id. at 36. Accord Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,970 (Aug. 29, 1974).
The IRS stated that th,is case is distinguishable from Rev. Rul. 63-181, 1963-2 C.B. 74
because in Rev. Rul. 63-181 the payment to petitioner was computed with reference to the
nature of the injury and not with respect to the petitioner'S absence from work as was done
here. Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,970 (Aug. 29, 1974).
134. Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,477 (Aug. 15, 1980). Because one of the provisions of
petitioner'S plan called for the termination of disability benefits if petitioner returned to
work, the IRS concluded that the benefiis were computed with regard to employee's ab
sence from "work and "denied his § \05(c) claim. Id. See also Tech. Adv. Mem. 8,430,003
(Mar. 28, 1984). Due to his multiple sclerosis, the petitioner lost the use of his legs and
received payments under his employer's commercial insurance policy. In ruling that the
benefits were excludible under § \05(c), the IRS stated that the payments satisfied the re
quirement of "unrelated to absence from work" because the petitioner continued to work
while receiving the payments. Id.
135. The Hines court decided the petitioner's claim on the issue of whether his loss
met the requirements of § \05(c)(I). Hines v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 715, 719"(1979). See
supra notes 113-30 and accompanying text. However, in dicta, the court noted that the
petitioner's plan also failed to satisfy the requirements of § \05(c)(2) because of its failure
to vary benefits according to the type of injury received (i.e., a pilot who suffers a" heart
attack and a pilot who loses a limb both collect the same amount of benefits). Id. at 720.
136. For example, if the plan states that an employee suffering a career~ending heart
attack receives "X" amount of dollars and an employee who loses a leg receives "Y"
amount of dollars, the plan satisfies this requirement. The Senate Committee Report of
fered an example of a hypothetical plan which would satisfy the requirements of § \05(c):
The following examples will illustrate the kind of payments excludible from gross
income under [§ \05(c»). Assume that under the plan of an employer payments
equal to 25 percent of annual compensation are made to employees for loss of a
leg. The $\0,000 employee would therefore receive a payment of $2,500 and the
$4,000 employee would receive a payment of $1,000. These amounts would be
excludible from gross income if, under the plan, they are payable regardless of the
period that the employee is absent from work.
S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. \05, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN.
NEWS 4820.
""
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INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 105(c)(2}-BEYOND
CONGRESSIONAL INTENT

Beisler v. Commissioner

While the courts and the IRS generally are justified in interpret
ing section 105 in a restrictive fashion, they occasionally apply an
overly-restrictive test and overstep the boundaries which Congress has
defined. A recent decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
Beisler v. Commissioner,137 is such a case.
In Beisler, the en bane court affirmed the Tax Court and panel
denial of a section 105 exclusion claim.138 The petitioner Randall
Beisler played professional football from 1966 to 1975.139 In 1975,
while playing for the Kansas City Chiefs, Beisler suffered an injury
that caused him to lose sixty to seventy-nine percent of the use of his
neck. 14O His doctors advised him to stop playing football and to avoid
.strenuous labor for the remainder of his life. 141
The National Football League (NFL) provides for injured players
through the Bert Bell National Football League Retirement Plan
(NFL Plan) which compensates players who incur a "substantial dis
ablement" while playing in an NFL game. 142 Under the NFL Plan, a
player who incurs a "substantial disablement" may receive, for up to
sixty months, a monthly "line-of-duty" disability benefit calculated
with respect to the player's accumulated benefit credits. 143 Following
the approval of his application for "line-of-duty" disability benefits,
Beisler received a total of $47,475.00 in payments from the NFL Plan
137. 814 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1987).
138. Beisler v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 534 (1985),
(9th Cir. 1986).
139. Beis/er, 814 F.2d at 1305.
Id.·
Id.
142. Id. at

off'd,

787 F.2d 1325

140.

141.

1305-06. A "substantial disablement" is defined by the NFL Plan as a
permanent disability which:
(A) Results in a partial bodily disability of 50% or more, or the loss of 50% or
more of speech or sight; or 50% or more loss of use of the neck or back; or
(B) Results in 60% or more loss of use of the hearing or an arm, shoulder, leg,
or hip; or
(C) Results in 80% or more loss of use of a hand, wrist, elbow, foot, ankle or
knee; or
(D) Is the primary or contributory cause of the surgical removal or major func
tional impairment of a vital bodily organ or part of the central nervous system.
Id. at 1306 n.1.
143. [d. at 1305-06. The following table, derived from Article 4.1 of the NFL Plan,
shows the amount of Benefit Credits accrued by an eligible player for each credited season
from 1966 to 1975.
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in 1979, $10,552.00 of which he reported as pension income for that
year.l44 The Commissioner of the IRS assessed a deficiency in
Beisler's income tax in 1979 in the amount of $9,291.18 and an addi
tional tax of $478.06 under section 6653(a) of the Internal Revenue
Code. 14s Beisler paid the tax and appealed to the Tax Court for a
refund, alleging that the NFL payments were eligible for exclusion
under section 105(c). The Tax Court ruled that the entire amount
constituted income for tax purposes and denied the refund. 146 On ap
peal, in both its panel and en banc decisions, the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed the Tax Court decision and denied Beisler's claim
for exclusion. 147
In its en banc decision, the Beisler court acknowledged, but did
not apply, the standard three-part test which a taxpayer must satisfy
in order to exclude disability benefits under section 105(c):'48 (1) that
the amount received was paid through an accident or health insurance
plan;'49 (2) that the amount "constitute[s] payment for the permanent
loss or loss of use of a member or function of the body;"'SO and (3)
that the amount is "computed with reference to the nature of the in
jury without regard to the period the employee is absent from
work."ISI Relying on dicta in the earlier Tax Court decision of Hines
v. Commissioner,'52 the court denied Beisler's exclusion because the
Credited Season

Benefit Credit

1966 ................................. " .... , ............ $ 65
1967. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
1968.................................................... 85
1969 ..................... " . . . . . . .. . . . . . ..... .. .... ... .. 85
1970 .. " ................................................ 100
1971. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 105
1972 .................................................... 110
1973 ..................................................... 110
1974 ....... " ........................................... 110
1975 .................................................... 110

Beisier, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) at 536 n.4.
144. Beisier, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) at 536.
145. Id. at 535.
146. Id. at 534.
147. See Beisler v. Commissioner, 787 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1986), aff'd on reh'g, 814
F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1987).
148. Beisier, 814 F.2d at 1306.
149. Id. See 26 U.S.c. § 105(a) (1982).
150. Id. See 26 U.S.C. § 105(c)(1) (1982).
151. Id. See 26 U.S.C. § 105(c)(2) (1982).
152. 72 T.C. 715 (1979). Although the Hines court made its determination based on
§ 105(c)(I), it did comment on what was necessary to qualify under § 105(c)(2). See Hines,
72 T.C. at 720-21; see supra notes 113-30 and accompanying text.
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NFL Plan failed to vary benefits according to the type and severity of
the injury.lS3
The court emphasized that only when its expanded "nature of the
injury" requirement is satisfied do the payments properly reflect an
exclusively compensatory purpose, and only then may the benefits be
el{cluded under section 105. 154 Although the NFL Plan contained a
threshold disability definition that was based on the nature of the in
jury, ISS it failed the Beisler test, because it computed benefits for eligi
ble beneficiaries solely on the basis of the number of seasons the player
had been in the NFL.lS6 Under the NFL Plan, the ten-year veteran
player who has lost the total use of his leg and the ten-year veteran
who has lost eighty percent use of his ankle would both receive the
same amount of benefits, even though one injury is much more severe
than the other. For this reason, the court held that Beisler could not
exclude the benefits he received from the NFL Plan. 157
From a purely textual standpoint, the Beisler court's ruling seems
persuasive. Section 105(c)(2) explicitly states that the benefits paid
from an accident or health insurance plan must be computed "with
reference to the nature of the injury."IS8 When the player satisfies the
NFL Plan's eligibility requirement, the benefits he receives, in fact, are
computed with reference to the number of the games he has played
rather than with reference to the nature of the injury that he has in
curred. Thus, the NFL Plan fails to comply with the literal meaning
of section 105(c)(2).
The Beisler court, however, did not pursue this line of reasoning
when it denied Beisler's exclusion. The court ignored the legislative
intent to provide some form of relief to those who are injured perma
nently,IS9 and added "severity" to the requirement that benefits be
computed with reference to the nature of the injury. However, a "se
153. Beisier, 814 F.2d at 1307. Because the court decided the issue solely on this
point, it refused to offer an opinion on whether the NFL Plan satisfied the traditional three
part test. Id.
154. Id. at 1308.
155. See supra note 142. In order to qualify for benefits, the player must experience a
specified percentage loss or loss of use of the injured area. For instance, a player suffering a
leg injury must lose at least sixty percent of the leg's use in order to be eligible. Thus, the
player who loses his leg, a one-hundred percent or total loss, and a player who retains forty
percent use of his leg are both within the same category.
156. Beisier, 814 F.2d at 1309.
157. Id.
158. See 26 U.S.C. § 105(c)(2) (1982).
159. The purpose of the original exclusion statute, § 213(b)(6), a purpose which Con
gress has retained, was to provide some form of relief to those who suffer from pain associ
ated with a permanent injury. See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
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verity" requirement is not based upon legislative history or statutory
language, but upon the court's belief that the NFL Plan payments
were inherently unfair and favored those players who incurred less
severe injuries. The court did not question the NFL Plan's threshold
eligibility requirement. It denied the exclusion because, under the
payment system established by the NFL Plan, a player who becomes a
quadriplegic as a result of an injury and a player who loses eighty
percent of the use of his hand could both receive the same amount of
benefits. Yet, the NFL Plan does not compensate for every single in
jury that occurs; only those persons with injuries that satisfy the defi
nition of "substantial disablement" will be compensated. l60
As stated above, subsection (c)(2) requires, in part, that disability
payments be "computed with reference to the nature of the injury."161
In total, subsection (c)(2) is intended to preserve the exclusion only for
permanent disability benefits. This requirement therefore prevents a
taxpayer from excluding compensation for lost wages under section
105(c).162 Prior to Beisler, this requirement was interpreted to mean
that the payments must vary according to the type of injury re
ceived,163 an interpretation that was more than adequate in achieving
Congress' desire that the use of the exclusion privilege be restricted to
those who suffer permanent disabilities.
The Beisler court, however, has unnecessarily added a further re
quirement to this test. According to the court, the payments now
must be computed with reference to the severity of the injury as well as
with reference to the nature of the injury.
The "Beisler test" of severity cannot be justified. l64 The word
"severity" never is mentioned in the statute,165 the corresponding
See supra note 142.
161. 26 U.S.C. § 105(c)(2) (1982).
162. See supra notes 52-67 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 131-36 and accompanying text.
164. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Noonan stated that the majority's line of rea
soning would be proper if § 105(c) stated that payments are excludible "if computed only in
proportion to the severity of the injury and without regard to the number of years of ser
vice." Beisler, 814 F.2d at 1309 (Noonan, J., dissenting). However, § 105(c)(2) does not
contain this language.
In addition to this, Judge Noonan supported his argument with the fact that payments
from the NFL Plan would be reduced accordingly if workers' compensation payments were
made to the player. Since workers' compensation statutes normally vary their benefits
based on the degree of loss of bodily functions, payments under the NFL Plan would vary
with the nature of the injury. Id. at 1310. Finally, Judge Noonan argued that to tax such
payments is inconsistent with and contrary to the supporting legislative history. Id.
165. See supra text accompanying note 48 for the language of § 105(c).
160.
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Treasury Regulation,166 or the legislative history accompanying sec
tion 105. 167 It is an addition which is unwarranted in light of the suit
ability of the test which it modified. The addition of "severity" by the
Beisler court serves no other purpose than to unduly restrict the exclu
sion privilege far beyond what Congress intended.
One way to demonstrate the difficulties with the Beisler approach
is to ask what more the NFL Plan could have done to satisfy the court
and the IRS. The Beisler court indicated that a plan must have a
schedule that tailors benefits to each specific injury.168 Would Beisler
have been decided differently if the NFL Plan provided a benefit scale
which stated that a player who loses the total use of his legs and arms
receives $10,010.00 and a player who loses seventy percent use of his
neck receives $1O,000.00? According to the Beisler court's reasoning,
payments under such a benefit scale would qualify for exclusion.
However, the number of differing disabilities resulting from a contact
sport like football are far too numerous to "itemize" within a disability
plan. Instead of cataloging every possible injury that a football player
could incur, the drafters of the NFL Plan sensibly created four catego
ries of permanent injuries. In order for the player to be eligible for
benefits, the player's injury must fall within one of these categories,
thus satisfying a threshold requirement. In this way, the NFL Plan
met the section 105(c)(2) requirement that benefits be "computed with
reference to the nature of the injury."169
The Beisler court's requirement that the payments be computed
with reference to the "severity" of the injury is indicative of its displea
sure with the NFL ~lan only because of the chance that a severely
injured player could receive less than a player who incurs injuries
which are less severe. 170 To judge a section 105 claim in such a way
not only is an injustice to the disabled taxpayer but also is inconsistent
with Congress' intent when it enacted section 105. Congress does de
sire to have a restrictive interpretation of section 105. However,
166. See Treas. Reg. § 1.105-3 (1988).
167. See supra notes 49-50, 56-58 and accompanying text.
168. Beisler, 814 F.2d at 1308.
169. The dissent in Beisler argued that the use of the threshold requirement test in
the NFL Plan satisfied the "computed with reference to the nature of the injury" require
ment of § 105(c)(2) because it "relates the specific nature of the injuries to the payment of
benefits." Id. at 1309-10 (Noonan, J., dissenting).
170. For example, a three year veteran player in the NFL who becomes a
quadriplegic as a result of an injury suffered in an NFL game and a 10 year veteran who
loses the use of 80% of his left hand would both qualify to receive benefits from the NFL
Plan. However, under the NFL Plan, the player who lost 80% of the use of his hand would
receive more disability compensation than the quadriplegic because the 10 year veteran has
accumulated more benefit credits over the 10 year period. See supra notes 142-43.
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before Beisler, such an interpretation had been established and served
that purpose.
The effect of the Beisler decision is to restrict section lOS's use
unduly and, as a result, stifle Congress' intent that some form of relief
be provided to those who suffer because of serious injury or disease.
Randall Beisler is left with only twenty percent of the use of his neck,
and all of his benefits are subject to taxation.
It is the judiciary's duty to interpret and apply the statutes and
the laws which Congress enacts, but that duty is restricted by the will
of Congress as expressed in the statute. Thus, it is the Beisler court's
duty to ensure that the benefits are generated from an accident or
health plan, that the payment represents compensation for a perma
nent loss, and that the payment is computed with reference to the na
ture of the injury. Prior to Beisler, satisfaction of these requirements
was ensured through application of a series of tests. The Beisler
court's addition of "severity" does nothing more than question the
fairness of the payment, an inquiry which undoubtedly is outside the
judicial prerogative established by Congress when it enacted section
105 in 1954.
V.

CONCLUSION

Since the enactment of the original statute in 1918, Congress has
retained the original purpose of the exclusion statute: to offer some
form of relief to those who must endure the pain and suffering associ
ated with permanent disabilities. Throughout the years, the statute
has served that purpose well, but it also has experienced change in the
wake of an additional congressional desire to preserve and protect this
privilege. This additional purpose is served by section 105, which
Congress enacted in 1954. In section 105, Congress included precise
conditions which disability payments must satisfy before taxpayers can
exclude such payments from their income. Since the enactment of sec
tion 105(c), Congress has not altered its language in any way. The
jUdiciary and the IRS, however, have formulated and applied a series
of tests, molded from their restrictive interpretation of the statutory
language and the accompanying legislative history of section 105. The
judicial creation of tests is not necessarily wrong nor violative of legis
lative intent. Indeed, some of the tests ensure the proper application
of section 105, such as the test which the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit created in Caplin v. United States.'7'
171.

718 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1983).
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The Caplin court formulated an analysis which is restrictive and
therefore protects section 105 from taxpayer abuse, thereby complying
with the congressional intent of section 105.172 Yet, the "Caplin anal
ysis" still remains faithful to the purpose underlying the original ex
clusion statute, section 213(b)(6), to provide relief to those who are
permanently disabled.
At other times, the IRS has formulated an approach which is of
questionable validity but is not directly violative of congressional in
tent. For example, the approach which the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals endorsed in Hines v. Commissioner 173 is consistent with the
congressional intent underlying section 105(c). However, there are in
stances when the application of this approach may deny a legitimate
claim by a disabled taxpayer because the loss of body function may not
satisfy the IRS' standards or expectations. Despite these instances,
both of the preceding approaches essentially are consistent with the
statutory language and the legislative history of the statute.
However, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Beisler v. Com
missioner 174 recently formulated a test which undoubtedly violates the
very foundation section 105 evolved from.175 The Beisler court cre
ated and applied a test which unnecessarily restricts the use of section
105, and, as a result, people who are permanently disabled and there
fore within the class that Congress intended to provide for in 1918 are
denied the right to exclude their disability benefits from gross income.
Prior to 1954, judicial and IRS applications of the exclusion stat
ute, section 22(b)(5), were inconsistent and unpredictable. The IRS
contradicted themselves numerous times with regard to what qualified
as insuranceY6 This resulted in an untold amount of confusion and
uncertainty. In 1954, Congress, out of necessity, intervened in order
to squelch this uncertainty and confusion. The present pattern of
quality of interpretation and tests, from good to questionable to bad,
indicates that Congress should once again intervene and affirmatively
act. Congress again should remind courts of the original purpose of
the exclusion statute before they deny more legitimate section 105
claims.
Brendan M Fox
172. For a detailed discussion of the "Caplin analysis," see supra notes 84-101 and
accompanying text.
173. 72 T.C. 715 (1979). See supra notes 113-30 and accompanying text.
174. 814 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1987). See supra notes 137-70 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 17-24 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 25-45 and accompanying text.

